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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A CLOSER LOOK AT
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND STATE AID
TO RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED
SCHOOLS
RONALD D. ROTUNDAt
INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to be here to participate in this celebration of the bicentennial
of the United States Constitution. It is also particularly pleasing to be a part of
the event honoring Professor Eugene Gressman on the occasion of his retire-
ment. And finally, I am equally honored to be asked to be involved in a celebra-
tion that includes so many distinguished representatives from academia, the
judiciary, and the legislative branch. I am reminded of the autobiography that
the young daughter of Senator Taft wrote when she was in early grammar
school: "My grandfather was Chief Justice and President; my father is a United
States Senator; and I am a Brownie." I am just a Brownie compared to the
speakers you have heard today.
Because the topic on which I have been asked to speak today-the Consti-
tutional Future of the Bill of Rights-is hardly self-limiting, I hope you will
excuse me if I do not purport to be exhaustive. Nor do I intend to make detailed
and specific predictions of all that the future holds, for that will serve only to
prove my fallibility. Instead I would like to focus on a general theme that will
face the Supreme Court as it enters the twenty-first century: the need to protect
civil liberties through the reasoned and consistent elaboration of prior case law.
I plan to illustrate the Court's failure to offer consistency by briefly considering
two first amendment case studies, one involving commercial speech, the other
dealing with state financial aid to private schools when some of those schools are
religiously affiliated.
Historical celebrations are a good time to step back and take a good look at
our historical heritage. When our Government first saw the dawn of the new
Constitution, the Supreme Court was hardly a powerful legal or political entity.
It was not until September 24, 1789, that President George Washington signed
the first judiciary act into law and then sent to the Senate his nominations to the
high court.1
The first Chief Justice was John Jay, then only forty-four years old. Jay
had very little judicial experience prior to his appointment, and while he was
Chief, he spent much of his time abroad, involved in diplomatic duties. In 1795
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
1. Law of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 73-93.
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he would resign to become Governor of New York. John Rutledge of South
Carolina, another nominee, never attended a formal session of the Court. He
would resign after three years. Washington also nominated Robert Hanson
Harrison, who rejected the honor in order to become Chancellor of Maryland.
To fill that slot, in the following year Washington nominated James Iredell of
North Carolina, then only thirty-eight years of age. Iredell would resign in
1799. He was the only member of the first Court who moved his family to New
York, then the Capitol. Washington also nominated John Blair of Virginia, who
had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Blair attended Court ses-
sions irregularly and resigned in 1796 because of ill health. James Wilson of
Pennsylvania was another nominee. He served on the Court until he died in
1798. The only Washington nominee to serve past 1800 was William Cushing of
Massachusetts. 2
At first the new Court, which was full strength with only six members, had
very little business. The first term lasted only about a week. All the Court did
was to set up house, appoint a clerk, and admit a few attorneys. The second
term lasted only two days.3 It was not until February of 1793 that the Court
reached its first really major decision. The beginning was inauspicious. The
case, Chisolm v. Georgia,4 was soon overruled by the eleventh amendment.5
The year following Chisolm, Jay accepted the position as a special ambassa-
dor to England, while remaining Chief Justice, although many contemporaries
criticized Jay's dual appointments as a violation of the American principle of
separation of powers. About one year later Jay resigned from the Court.6 Jay's
replacement was Senator Oliver Ellsworth-the Senate rejected Washington's
first choice, and his second declined the offer. In 1799 Ellsworth became Am-
bassador to France; he resigned from the Court the next year.7
The new President, John Adams, asked Jay to reassume his position, to
become not only the first Chief Justice but also the third. The Senate confirmed
Jay, but he declined. Adams eventually turned to John Marshall, who was (and
remained) his Secretary of State.8
2. See R. BARRY, MR. RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1942); 1 L. FRIEDMAN & F.
ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 3-22 (John Jay, by Irving Dillard); 33-49 (John Rutledge, by Leon Friedman); 57-
70 (William Cushing, by Herbert A. Johnson); 79-96 (James Wilson, by Robert G. McCloskey); 109-
115 (John Blair, Jr., by Fred Israel) (1969); 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 552-54, 663-65, 749 (1971);
GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 8, 9, 11 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1979) [hereinafter
GUIDE]; R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY: THE NATION AND THE COURT (1967); C.P. WILSON, JAMES WIL-
SON, FOUNDING FATHER: 1742-1798 (1956); Connor, James Iredell: Lawyer, Statesman, Judge
1751-1799, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 225 (1912); Rugg, William Cushing, 30 YALE L.J. 128 (1920).
3. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 8.
4. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 734-41.
5. U.S. CONT. amend. XI. Congress proposed this amendment on September 5, 1794. 3 R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PRO-
CEDURE 677 (1986).
6. J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 747-48.
7. J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 749-78; GUIDE, supra note 2, at 11. For a general discussion of
Ellsworth's life, see W. BROWN, LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1970) (first published 1905).
8. 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 3; R. ROTUNDA, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 3-4 (1987).
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Marshall was technically a lawyer, but he had very little legal training,
though he actually had argued one case before the Supreme Court (which he
lost).9 Marshall was really a politician, and he used his political skills to make
the Supreme Court much of what it is today.
In the beginning, the Court's exercises of power were very tentative. We
sometimes forget that after Marbury v. Madison I--in which Marshall first ar-
ticulated the doctrine of judicial review-the Marshall Court would never again
invalidate an act of Congress. Yet under Marshall's guidance, the Court's pres-
tige and influence grew.
Marshall's successor, Roger Taney, drank deeply of the judicial power that
Marshall had slowly accumulated. Today we remember Taney mainly because
of Dred Scott v. Sanford.11 In that case, as you recall, he held that it was uncon-
stitutional for Congress to forbid slavery or to seek to contain it. He ignored
adverse historical evidence in his rush to write an unconvincing opinion and to
"solve" the slavery crisis by coming down firmly on the side of slavery. 12
Dred Scott was only the second time in our history that the Court invali-
dated an act of Congress. The second effort was not nearly as successful as the
first. The decision has become called one of the Court's great "self-inflicted
wounds." 13
If we stand back, we can see that Marshall slowly added to the prestige and
power of the Court as it embarked on the great task of nation-building during
the first third of the Court's history. 14 If Marshall acted like a miser in the
exercise of judicial review, Taney was a spendthrift. With Dred Scott Taney
squandered the treasure chest of prestige that Marshall had carefully
accumulated. 15
For several decades after Dred Scott, the Court was relatively quiet. Then,
around the turn of the century, the pendulum shifted again, and the Court began
its long campaign to protect economic due process. The deluge probably began
with Lochner v. New York;16 it ended with the Court Packing Plan of 1937.17
Once again, as the Court became too active, as the decisions looked more and
more unprincipled, the Court faced a crisis, and lost valuable public
confidence.1 8
9. J. GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 748-52.
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a general discussion ofMarbury v. Madison, see Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 150, 155.
13. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, METH-
ODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 50 (1928).
14. See R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
15. See Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrine, 17 AM.
HisT. REV. 52 (1911).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional the efforts of New York to enact maximum
hour legislation for bakers).
17. 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at §§ 2.7, 4.7; R. ROTUNDA, THE
POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 75-78 (1986).
18. Though Congress, led by members of the President's own party, rejected the Court Packing
Plan, the Congressmen were painfully aware of the increased activeness of the Court. A list of
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Following the Court Packing Plan, the Court once again appeared to lie in
wait, catching its breath. During the McCarthy years it was not at the forefront
protecting rights of speech and association.1 9 Then, after 1953, with Earl War-
ren's assumption of the Chief Justiceship, the judicial pendulum began to shift
towards activism. 20
Rather than focusing on nation-building or economic due process, the mod-
ern Court theme since the middle 1950s appears to be individual rights. The
Court, of course, decides constitutional cases involving many other provisions of
the Constitution, but the main theme is still individual rights and civil liberties.
Will the modem judicial activism lead to excesses, to another self-inflicted
wound? Will the pendulum shift once again? Will the modem Court become so
active that it finds itself squandering its carefully built-up prestige?
I make no claim to predict the future. The Court's future is not
predestined. But I do submit that to the extent that the Court's activism leads to
decisions that appear to be void of any sort of principle, or inconsistent with
principles that the Court contemporaneously embraces, the Court flirts with the
dangers of the past. The body politic does not necessarily react negatively to
judicial activism. The last three decades furnish proof of that, for the Court,
during much of this time, has been both active and popular. Yet important
judicial decisions that are based on fundamentally inconsistent principles por-
tend trouble. The body politic found it difficult to accept cases like Dred Scott
and Lochner because they were more unrestrained raw exertions of political
power than reasoned, consistent developments of prior principles.
There is, in a sense, a certain geometry to judicial review. The Constitution
is a postulate; the Court takes it as a given. There are other postulates as well.
The judge should look to "text, history, structure, and precedent" 2 1 in order to
find core values, or major premises. The judge then supplies "the minor prem-
ises in order to protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances the framers
could not foresee." '22 As Chief Justice Marshall said nearly one and three-
quarters of a century ago, the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs....
[and to] exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and
which can be best provided for as they occur."
23
The Court, after analyzing the structure of the constitutional text, relevant
history, and its own precedents, develops new principles, new postulates. The
Supreme Court decisions invalidating acts of Congress to 1936 may be found at 80 CONG. REC.
9251-54 (1936).
19. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d
241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
20. While 1954 saw the dramatic opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Brown I), the new activism of the Court did not develop overnight. As late as 1958, Warren could
write: "In some 81 instances since this Court was established it has determined that Congressional
action exceeded the bounds of the Constitution." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
21. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 394 (1985).
22. Bork, in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION at 46 (The
Federalist Society 1986).
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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Court reasons from these basic postulates. The Court is supposed to engage in
reasoned elaboration of the principles it has developed-applying them to new
fact situations. In this manner the law can grow. These principles should also
provide guidance to the lower courts and the executive and legislative branches
of both the state and federal governments. The lower courts, and those officials
responsible for implementing and enforcing rights, cannot do their job effectively
if the Court decisions appear unprincipled.
Of course, not every case will necessarily present, full-blown, the principle
or minor premise that the Court is developing. Common-law reasoning, includ-
ing (perhaps, especially) constitutional reasoning, often proceeds inductively. In
some instances it may take several years before a later Court, or an academic,
steps back a bit, looks at the trees, and sees the forest. Constitutional scholars
perform a very useful service when they help justify and rationalize earlier
decisions.
When different Supreme Court decisions are not consistent-if the princi-
ples developed in one case are inconsistent with those developed in others-it is
also a useful service to point this problem out as well. When we subject the
Court to this criticism, we hopefully will encourage the Court to look more
carefully at its reasoning. We often tritely observe that although the Court has
neither the power of the purse nor the sword, we still obey its judgments. Yet, to
the extent that the decisions are well-reasoned, our obedience is easier, because it
is less an act of faith than an act of reason.
In recent years the Court appears to be much more content with relying on
our faith. More and more of its decisions appear to be based on principles fun-
damentally inconsistent with other cases. The problem is not that the new law
appears different from old, almost forgotten law. It is more serious than that.
Often the cases that are inconsistent were decided by the same justices in the
space of a few years. To be sure, the problem of inconsistency, even if it has
gotten worse, is not one which the modern Court invented. The difference, you
may say, is only one of degree, not of kind. Yet differences of degree, when great
enough, become differences in kind. It is as if the Court is performing Euclidian
and non-Euclidian geometry problems together and not acknowledging that the
postulates are internally inconsistent.
In the short time remaining I will only be able to look at two major areas to
illustrate the problem. First, let us consider the area of commercial speech.
Then, we shall turn to some of the recent cases involving financial aid to non-
secular education.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
As we all know, a few years ago the Supreme Court finally decided that
commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protection. A majority of the
Court agreed on a four-part test in the Central Hudson decision. 24 In that case,
the Court invalidated a regulation of the New York Public Service Commission
24. Central Hudson Gas Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see 3 R.
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that had completely banned all public utility advertising which promoted the use
of electricity. The Commission argued that all such promotional advertising
was contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. The Court, in an opin-
ion authored by Justice Powell, applied a four-part analysis to the question:
At the outset we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. [1] For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. [2] Next we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, [3] we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental inter-
est asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.25
Applying this test, the Central Hudson Court invalidated the New York
regulation. The Court reasoned that promotional advertising was not mislead-
ing and concerns lawful commercial speech; 26 it is legal in New York to use
inefficient electric hair dryers, electric toothbrushes, heat pumps, and so on. The
state does have substantial interests in energy conservation, the Court acknowl-
edged, and the ban on promotional advertising does advance this ban. But the
state's complete suppression of speech was more extensive than necessary to fur-
ther energy conservation,27 because some promotional advertising would cause
no net increase in energy use. For example, advertising promoting the use of
electricity that diverts demand from less efficient sources, or advertising promot-
ing a product that consumes the same amount of energy as do alternative
sources causes no net increase in energy usage. Much more significant is the fact
that other restrictions might equally promote conservation. The state could "re-
quire that the advertisements include information about the relative efficiency
and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions and for the
foreseeable future."' 28 The cure for "bad" speech is more speech, not less. Also,
the state has other means that do not implicate free speech at all. Thus, the state
can ban, or heavily tax, inefficient heat pumps.
The four-part test of Central Hudson is based on a two-step method of anal-
ysis synthesized from the modern commercial speech cases. First, a court must
determine whether the speech is truthful, nonmisleading speech concerning a
lawful commercial activity. Promotion of an illegal activity-such as violating
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at §§ 20.26-20.30; Rotunda, The Commercial
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1080.
25. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
26. Accord Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (aw prohibiting mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives invalid).
27. Compare NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (store boycott organ-
ized to influence government practices protected by first amendment) with NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 618 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart,
and Rehnquist, J3.) (Congress, consistent with first amendment, may prohibit secondary picketing
calculated "to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order
to force him to cease dealing with, or put pressure upon, the primary employer"; such coercive
picketing spreads labor discord by coercing neutral party to join the dispute and furthers an unlawful
objective).
28. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571.
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sex-discrimination laws by advertising for "men only" jobs, when gender is not a
bona fide occupational qualification-is not protected advertising.29 In fact, the
government's interest in protecting the public from false or genuinely misleading
advertising is so great that the Court has held that the government, when it
prohibits false or misleading commercial speech, will not be subjected to over-
breadth analysis and will not be required to demonstrate that its law is no more
extensive than necessary to achieve that goal.
30
If the government regulation restricts nonmisleading commercial advertis-
ing, then a court must determine whether the state restriction directly advances
a substantial government interest without unnecessary restrictions on free
speech. The regulation will fail if the interest is not sufficiently substantial to
justify a restriction on speech or if the means used to advance a substantial inter-
est either do not directly advance the government interest or do so with an un-
necessary burden on the ability to communicate the commercial message.3 1
So far, so good. But then came Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tour-
ism Co. of Puerto Rico.32 Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissent in Central Hudson,
authored the five-to-four opinion in Posadas. The broad language of Posadas is
either fundamentally at odds with Central Hudson, or Posadas itself is a sport, of
almost no significance.
In Posadas, Justice Rehnquist upheld a facial constitutional attack on a Pu-
erto Rico statute interpreted to restrict local advertising that invited the resi-
dents of Puerto Rico to patronize gambling casinos; however, the statute did not
restrict local advertising targeted at tourists, even though the local advertising
aimed at the tourists may incidentally reach the hands of a resident.
The Court purported to apply the general principles identified in Central
Hudson. In fact, Posadas frequently cited Central Hudson as controlling prece-
dent. The Posadas Court gave no hint that it was in any way undermining Cen-
tral Hudson, a precedent only six years old. Justice Powell, who authored
Central Hudson, joined in the majority opinion in Posadas.
The commercial speech in Posadas, conceded the Court, "concerns a lawful
activity and is not misleading or fraudulent."'33 Casino gambling in Puerto Rico
is a lawful activity. However, the governmental interest in reducing the demand
for casino gambling by Puerto Rico residents was substantial, the Court said,
because the legislature apparently believed that excessive casino gambling would
29. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
30. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462-65 (1978).
31. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the justices were unanimous in
striking down a federal statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements.
The majority opinion argued that the interest in shielding mail recipients from offensive materials
was not sufficiently substantial to burden speech, and that the regulation did not directly and nar-
rowly promote a substantial interest in aiding parents' efforts to discuss birth control methods with
their children. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, 463 U.S. at 75-80 (concurring), and Justice Ste-
vens, 463 U.S. at 80-84 (concurring), would have considered a government interest in protecting
persons from receiving material they find offensive in their homes to be substantial. However, they
believed that the law before them did not sufficiently promote that interest. All justices appeared to
agree with the two-step methodology inherent in the four-part test put forth in Central Hudson.
32. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
33. Id. at 2976.
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seriously harm the health, safety, and welfare of Puerto Rico citizens. 34 Also,
the challenged restrictions "directly advance" Puerto Rico's asserted interest be-
cause "the legislature's belief is a reasonable one."'35
In spite of the legislature's apparent concern over the evils of casino gam-
bling if engaged in by Puerto Ricans, the legislature freely allowed advertising
involving other forms of gambling, such as horse racing, cockfighting, and the
lottery. 36 Nonetheless, the Court majority found no inconsistency or underin-
clusiveness. First, the advertising restrictions that do exist " 'directly advance'
the legislature's interest in reducing demand for games of chance,"' 37 and sec-
ond, the apparent legislative interest "is not necessarily to reduce demand for all
games of chance, but to reduce demand for casino gambling."' 38 The Court ar-
gued that the legislature must have felt that the risks associated with casino
gambling are greater because these other forms of gambling " 'have been tradi-
tionally part of the Puerto Rican's roots.' -39 Finally, the challenged law was
said to have met the fourth test of Central Hudson: the restriction, limited to
advertising aimed at residents of Puerto Rico, is no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the governmental interest, which was to dampen demand for casino
gambling by Puerto Rican residents.4°
In earlier cases, such as Carey v. Population Services International,4 1 the
Court had held that advertising of contraceptives is protected commercial
speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia 42 the Court similarly had held that advertising of
an abortion clinic is constitutionally protected. But, said Posadas, in those cases
the "underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was
constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the state.
Here, on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohib-
ited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. '4 3 Then the
Posadas majority announced: "In our view the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of ca-
sino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite." 44 The Court thus
cited with approval lower court cases approving of advertising restrictions on
smoking and alcohol. 4 5
34. Id. at 2977.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 2977, 2978 n.8.
37. Id. at 2977.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting the trial court). An equally likely interpretation of legislative intent is that
Puerto Rico prefers that its residents spend their gambling money on the state run lottery. Id. at
2983 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). It is not unusual that speech
restrictions exist for less than noble reasons. The federal ban on cigarette advertising has all but
eliminated anti-cigarette ads, and it has served to protect existing market share. "It made it more
difficult for makers of low tar and nicotine brands to make headway in the market by advertising
their superior products." Wall St. J., May 18, 1976, at 18, col. 2.
40. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2977-78.
41. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
42. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
43. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2980 n.10.
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Let us more carefully compare Posadas with Central Hudson. The majority
in Posadas says that the "underlying conduct"-gambling "by the residents of
Puerto Rico"-was not constitutionally protected and could have been banned
completely. Is that true? Could Puerto Rico allow casino gambling for nonresi-
dents, and yet prohibit it to residents of Puerto Rico? If the majority assump-
tion is wrong, then Carey and Bigelow are hardly inapposite. Let us assume that
the majority's assumption is correct, although it may raise questions under the
equal protection clause and the dormant commerce clause.4 6
Consider now the majority principle of Posadas, that "the greater power to
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban ad-
vertising of casino gambling." What about the advertising restriction invali-
dated in Central Hudson? No one has a constitutional right to waste electricity.
New York, in Central Hudson, could have simply banned the use of all electric
hair dryers, or all energy inefficient heat pumps, or all electric toothbrushes. Yet
Central Hudson teaches us that New York could not, under the first amend-
ment, prohibit advertising that promotes the wasteful (but lawful) use of elec-
tricity. If New York cannot constitutionally dampen New Yorkers' demand for
electricity by prohibiting promotional advertising, can Puerto Rico dampen Pu-
erto Rican demand for casino advertising by prohibiting promotional
advertising?
In spite of what Justice Rehnquist said, Posadas cannot mean that the gov-
ernment has the power to ban all advertising for a product or service if the
government also had the power to make the product or service illegal. If it
meant that, it would overrule Central Hudson. Yet Posadas relied on Central
Hudson.
Perhaps one might argue that the gambling in Posadas is really different
from the energy waste in Central Hudson, because gambling can be harmful and
energy waste is not. The Court did not draw this distinction, perhaps because
Virginia Pharmacy47 foreclosed it. That case held that it was unconstitutional
for the state to restrict advertising promoting prescription drugs. Prescription
drugs can be harmful. That's why they are not freely available. Indeed, the
46. Puerto Rico is discriminating on the basis of residency in an activity that is a big business.
That discrimination may restrain commerce among the states. The Court has said that, in engaging
in a commerce clause analysis, it is "immaterial" that a political unit also discriminates against its
own state residents. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951); cf. Brimmer v.
Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891) (Virginia statute imposing fees for inspection of various meat
products, still invalid even though it applied to Virginia citizens). There is also an issue raised under
the comity clause. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). Someone
might respond that casino gambling is only recreation, but the Puerto Rico Legislature considered
casino gambling to be big business. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2977. The issue may also raise equal
protection questions of discrimination between residents and nonresidents. See Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982). Of course, Puerto Rico is discriminating against itself but the Court, in other
cases, has found that that fact does not make a crucial difference. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen-
eral Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
Some might also argue that the Puerto Rico law may possibly raise freedom of association
questions because it seeks to prevent Puerto Rico residents from associating with non-Puerto Rico
residents in casinos. The Roberts decision suggests that such an argument is unlikely to be greeted
with success. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-22 (1984).
47. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 478 (1976).
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harm from prescription drugs is much more certain than the assumptions the
Court made regarding the supposed unique harm flowing to Puerto Ricans who
engage in lawful casino gambling.
We have all seen advertisements that say something like: "Are you feeling
down? Have a headache? Try Excedrin." After Virginia Pharmacy a pharma-
cist has a constitutional right to run an advertisement that says: "Feeling blue?
Ask your doctor to prescribe valium. And when he does, buy it here. We're
cheaper."
A pharmacist has a constitutional right to promote (push) valium, but
Posadas draws a very different line when dealing with advertising of casino gam-
bling directed to Puerto Ricans. Unfortunately, the Court did not bother to
explain why.
Let us look more carefully at the law upheld in Posadas. The Puerto Rico
statute provided: "No gambling room shall be permitted to advertise, or other-
wise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico; or to admit persons under
18 years of age."'4 8 Posadas may only mean that it is legal to prohibit advertising
designed to induce people to do what the law already forbids.
The Posadas case began when a casino attacked the very extensive regula-
tions that implemented this statute. The Puerto Rico courts agreed that the
total ban was unconstitutional. They called it "capricious" and "arbitrary." 49
Then the lower courts adopted a very narrowing reinterpretation of the regula-
tion. It allowed all casino advertising in Puerto Rico or elsewhere, so long as the
advertising did not "invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino, even
though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident." 50
In fact, during oral argument the counsel for Puerto Rico said that a casino
advertising in a Spanish Language Daily with ninety-nine percent local circula-
tion would be permitted, so long as the advertising "is addressed to tourists and
not to residents."'' s
Recall that Puerto Rico law already prohibited casinos from admitting per-
sons under eighteen or from offering their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.
If it is illegal in Puerto Rico for casinos to admit persons under eighteen, then
casino advertising cannot invite minors to enter the casinos. Such advertising
would not concern lawful activity; it would solicit the commission of an illegal-
ity. If the law in fact prohibited Puerto Ricans from engaging in casino gam-
bling, we should not be too surprised that the Court upheld a ban on advertising
that invited Puerto Rican residents to enter the casino.
Unfortunately the Court majority, apparently more concerned with result
than reasoning, does not make clear what is its rationale. If the casino advertis-
ing restriction is valid because it prohibits advertising that concerns an unlawful
activity, why was it necessary for the Court to proclaim that "the greater power
to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban
48. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1972) (emphasis added).
49. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2973.
50. Id. at 2974.
51. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Posadas.
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advertising of casino gambling .... ,,?52 Perhaps the Court meant that this
greater ban had in fact been exercised. But then why did the majority appear to
state that it is legal for residents of Puerto Rico to frequent casinos?5 3 And why
did the Court cite with approval lower court cases upholding advertising restric-
tions on smoking? Although smoking may not be legal in certain areas at cer-
tain times, tobacco products still may be legally purchased and consumed.
Yet if the United States Supreme Court was fully embracing its dictum (the
power to ban a product includes the "lesser" power to ban speech advertising
that product), why did it only hold that the limited restrictions in Posadas were
constitutional on their face? The Court explicitly left open the possibility of
invalidating the regulations if they were applied too restrictively. 54 The Court
also emphasized the narrowness of its ruling by noting that the legislative ban on
certain types of casino advertising was because of the unique cultural history of
Puerto Rico.55 I certainly do not adopt the argument, but the Court appeared to
be saying that just as it used to be illegal to sell whiskey to the Indians, it can be
illegal to offer casino gambling to Puerto Ricans. The Court did not demand
any evidence to support its unusual factual assumption, but that assumption also
appeared to form the basis of its unusual holding.
In dictum, Justice Rehnquist for the Posadas majority also appeared to up-
hold the ban on advertising of cigarettes on television, the electronic media.
This conclusion may indeed be the result the Court eventually chooses if the
issue is brought before it. Though the Court's record regarding the regulation of
the electronic media is ambivalent, in a variety of other cases, the Court has
approved of special restrictions on the electronic media (because the Court views
it as uniquely powerful), 5 6 while it has banned similar regulation of newspapers,
magazines, or handbills. 57 On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist only a few
years earlier had concluded that, in light of the modem commercial speech
cases, the Government could not completely ban television cigarette advertis-
ing.5 8 In Posadas Rehnquist does not explain why his view has changed.
Some people read Posadas quite broadly, to support a total ban on tobacco
advertising. Congressman Synar of Oklahoma has proposed that Congress ban
52. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
53. The Court stated as follows: "[Tihe Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited
casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether....
Appellant also makes the . . . argument that, having chosen to legalize casino gambling for
residents of Puerto Rico ....
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 2976 n.7.
55. Id. at 2977-78; cf. id. at 2976 n.6 (deference to Puerto Rico court's interpretation of local
law); id. at 2978 n.8 (legislative intent gauged from history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico).
56. Compare, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (broadcast medium has
the most limited first amendment protection of all forms of communications) and Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ("fairness doctrine," requiring broadcasters to allow for
rebuttal, embodied in FCC rules, held constitutional) with FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364 (1984) (ban on "editorializing" by television and radio stations receiving funds from Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting held violative of first amendment).
57. E.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
58. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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all advertising of tobacco products, "even window displays by stores that sell
them."'59 Posadas is said to justify such a ban. If cigarettes were illegal to
purchase, then a ban on all advertising of cigarettes would be quite constitu-
tional. But Posadas does not endorse a ban on all advertising of a product le-
gally available. Recall that the Court did not face a total ban; it emphasized the
narrowness of its holding and it only judged the law on its face after it had been
narrowly interpreted in an effort to save its constitutionality. Even the lower
courts in Posadas agreed that a total ban on casino advertising would be
unconstitutional. 60
Some people argue that any tobacco advertising is inherently misleading,
and that is why the government can prohibit all tobacco ads. The Supreme
Court has allowed prohibition of truly misleading speech but the mere charge
that speech is misleading is not enough. The organized bar argued that advertis-
ing of legal fees was inherently misleading. Bates rejected that position. 61 The
organized bar argued that it was misleading for a lawyer to advertise that he was
a member of the United States Supreme Court Bar, because such an advertise-
ment wrongly implied better quality. In re R.MJ. ,62 another case, rejected that
argument as well.
Nor can we prohibit all tobacco or casino advertising by arguing that adver-
tising is inherently misleading. Posadas does not even suggest that such adver-
tising is inherently misleading. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has noted: "Nearly all advertising associates the promoted product
with a positive or alluring lifestyle or famous or beautiful people. Our policy is
to leave it to the public to cope for themselves with Madison Avenue panache
and hard sells." 63
The Government can certainly forbid gambling or tobacco advertising urg-
ing young people to gamble or smoke, when it is illegal for the minors to do so.
But the Government cannot forbid all advertising of tobacco because children
may hear or read it. The "government may not 'reduce the adult population...
to reading only what is fit for children.' 64 The government could always pro-
hibit casino gambling, or tobacco (or foods rich in cholesterol), in order to dis-
courage demand, but it cannot discourage use by tampering with free speech.
If my narrow interpretation of Posadas is correct, the case is-to say the
least-opaquely written. If the case really means that states can ban advertising
in an effort to dampen demand for a legally offered product, then Posadas is
another example of unprincipled decision-making, for it relies on a principle
59. Scheibla, Not Just Blowing Smoke, Barron's, Mar. 2, 1987, at 11, col. 1.
60. See Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2973-74. The Supreme Court said that it was bound by this
narrowing construction, id. at 2976, and that it was considering only the facial constitutionality of
the statute and regulations, id. at 2972.
61. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
62. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). For a general discussion of Supreme Court decisions on commercial
speech, see 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at § 20.31.
63. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
64. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (quoting Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1952)).
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rejected in Central Hudson, the case on which Posadas purported to rely, not to
undermine.
FINANCIAL AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
For all the confusion in the commercial speech area, it is a calm sea com-
pared to the case law concerning financial aid to religiously affiliated schools. It
is understatement to note that the Supreme Court decisions in this area are diffi-
cult to understand. The decisions often have no majority opinion; several of the
justices have changed their viewpoints over the years; and the holdings follow no
consistent principle. 65 We know, for example, that the state can lend secular
textbooks to students who attend parochial schools, if it also lends textbooks to
students who attend public schools. 66 Yet while the state can lend the students
books of maps, it cannot lend the school a map.67
The distinction might appear to turn on the fact that the books are given to
the students, and the maps to the school.68 But in other cases the Court has
invalidated aid which goes directly to the students-such as tax credits69-yet
has upheld aid which goes directly to the school-such as aid to compensate
teachers for the time it takes to take attendance, or grade state-prepared stan-
dardized tests.70
The inconsistencies are dramatically put in focus if we consider a proposal
that various commentators have made through the years: a tuition voucher
system.7 1
When one looks at the cases, it at first appears unlikely that the Court
would validate any state or federal system that gave all school age children a
voucher which could be redeemed at a certified school.72 The voucher, if re-
deemed at the local public school, would pay for all the costs of a public school
education. If redeemed at a certified private school, (whether a religiously affili-
ated or nonreligiously affiliated school) the voucher would be worth a percentage
of the value of the voucher at the local public school. The percentage need not
be 100%. For example, if the local public school spends 5,000 dollars per year
to educate a child, the state-paid "tuition" is 5,000 dollars. The student could
always go to the local school and receive his or her "free" public education. In
an effort to foster diversity and pluralism in our democratic society, the state
could give each student a tuition voucher. This voucher when paid to the pri-
vate school might be worth 100% of its value at the public school, or a lesser
65. For a general discussion of this issue, see 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, supra
note 5, at §§ 21.2 - 22.4.
66. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
67. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975).
68. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971) (articulating this distinction).
69. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-89 (1973).
70. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
71. See, eg., Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L.
REV. 260 (1968); Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses, and the Nationalization of Edu-
cation, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 883 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 472
U.S. 402 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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amount, for example, three-fifths. In that case, if the public school could redeem
its voucher to the state in exchange for 5,000 dollars, the private school could
redeem its voucher for only 3,000 dollars. Public schools could then still have a
competitive advantage, but parents would have much more of a choice as to
where to send their children.
7 3
Some parents might choose to send their children to religiously affiliated
schools, but we would expect others to choose schools that emphasized foreign
language, or ballet, or music, or vocational training, or some other area of learn-
ing. If some students found it difficult to do well in a particular school because
of a discipline problem, the parents might decide to try sending their children to
a different school, one that emphasized discipline.74
A voucher system should encourage some parents to vote for school tax
increases. Now, those parents who send their children to parochial schools-
and in some areas of the country the proportion is large75-are not anxious to
vote for tax increases because they forfeit any direct benefits when they choose
to send their children to parochial school. In those areas parents who choose to
send their children to public school suffer from the low public expenditures. A
tuition voucher system will give an incentive to the parochial school parents to
vote for tax increases because these people will see a reasonable proportion of
the money raised coming back to them in the form of tuition vouchers. Con-
versely, the parents who do not send their children to parochial school will bene-
fit because the parochial school parents will be less reluctant to vote against tax
increases.
The Supreme Court, when it considers aid to school cases, often notes that,
in fact, the bulk of the state aid primarily benefits children in parochial schools,
and that is apparently a reason why this aid is unconstitutional. 76 This fact is
supposed to indicate that the aid has, and will promote, a nonsecular purpose.
Yet such reasoning suffers from the flaw of static thinking. The question is not
"Who benefits from the law today?"; it is rather "How will the law change the
educational landscape in the next few years?" If tuition vouchers were constitu-
tionally permissible, we should see the development of competition, of new di-
versity, and educational opportunity for the school children of the next
decade.77
73. See J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970);
Clark, Alternative Public School Systems, in EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY (Harv. Educ. Rev.
1969); cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (money
grants to nonpublic schools not to exceed 50% of the comparable expenses in public school system
invalidated).
74. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962) (discussing the
role of the government in education).
75. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 608 (1971) (25% of Rhode Island students attend
nonpublic elementary schools); see also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 91 (parochial schools disad-
vantaged by existing system of funding).
76. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971) (96% of students attending private schools
in Rhode Island were in church-related schools, most of which were Roman Catholic).
77. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 85-107; see also Magnet, America's Underclass. What to
do?, FORTUNE, May 11, 1987, at 130, 150 (Westside Prepatory School is a Chicago private school
for 244 mostly poor black children; the three year olds read at first grade level and 100% of the
graduates go on to college); Davidson, Private Schools for Black Pupils are Flourishing, Wall St. J.,
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Before we debate the wisdom of a tuition voucher system, we really must
see whether the proposal passes constitutional muster. If we look at the bottom
line, it is not difficult to find Supreme Court case law which concludes that no
aid is allowed. 78 Yet if we look at the recent case law more carefully, it seems
that the opposite conclusion is equally tenable.
We know that if a state created tuition vouchers, the parents could not
redeem them at a private school that practices racial discrimination, because it
would violate the equal protection clause for the state to facilitate racial segrega-
tion in this manner.79 But what if the school practices racial discrimination
because of a purported belief that the racial discrimination is religiously com-
pelled? The state should simply forbid the use of the voucher at such schools.
Such a state restriction does not require any unconstitutional "entanglement"
between church and state, nor does the restriction on such use of the vouchers
unconstitutionally burden religions with racially discriminatory beliefs. As the
Supreme Court held in the Bob Jones80 case, the state's special interest in not
fostering racial discrimination allows it to refuse to subsidize such religious
sects.
In Bob Jones, the federal government refused to grant tax exempt status to
Bob Jones University. If a person gave money to Bob Jones University, he or
she could not deduct the contribution as a charitable donation. If the federal
government can refuse to allow the subsidy of allowing the deduction of a chari-
table donation, a subsidy which the Court has called "indirect," 81 a fortiori the
federal government or a state can refuse to subsidize directly, with tuition dol-
lars, those religious schools that practice discrimination.
But, say others, the Supreme Court cases make clear that the state cannot
pay even a portion of a private school teacher's salary if that private school is
religiously affiliated.82 Yes, that is true, yet the Supreme Court has also held
that the state can pay a portion of a parochial school teacher's salary when the
teacher engages in so-called mandated state activities, like taking attendance or
grading state-mandated examinations such as achievement tests.83 What is the
marginal cost to the school when it complies with the state-mandated require-
ment of taking attendance? The cost must be fairly close to zero. The school
has the teacher on the payroll anyway. The attendance effort takes a few min-
utes from the school day, but it may well occur whether or not the state man-
dates it. Even if the attendance-taking is added to the day's work, the school is
Apr. 15, 1987, at 33, col. 3 (Low cost private schools flourishing "as many black parents, dissatisfied
with public education, seek affordable alternatives.").
78. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
79. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
80. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982) (religious claim to exemption from social security system rejected); Tony and Susan
Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (no religious exemption from minimum
wage laws).
81. Eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970) (tax exemption is indirect benefit,
and different from direct money subsidy).
82. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
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unlikely to raise the teacher's salary in order to compensate him or her for the
added minutes of work: after all, if the teacher is not taking attendance, he or
she is doing something else. Similarly, if the teacher is not grading a state-man-
dated examination, the teacher would still be grading another examination. And
that "other" examination may even be a similar achievement test, because par-
ents (and teachers) like to know how their students compare with the national
average.
When the Court upheld this state financial aid, it noted that the "'lion's
share'" of the state "'reimbursements'" were for "'attendance-reporting.' "84
That fact would suggest that the state is not really paying the marginal cost but
the average cost. For example, if the teacher works six hours a day, and attend-
ance responsibilities and examination duties average 30 minutes a day, the state
will pay 8 1/3% of the teacher's salary. Stated another way, the state is paying a
percentage of the private school's educational costs. That is all a tuition voucher
system does; it pays a given percentage of a school's expenses.
One might carry the logic a step further. The state not only mandates at-
tendance-taking; it mandates the teaching of reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Why should the state not pay for these mandated activities as well? There is no
"excessive entanglement" problem when the state requires the private schools-
parochial or otherwise-to offer the "three-R's." In order to be properly certi-
fied by the state, schools have had to comply with such requirements for years.
The state must go through the extra effort and expense it takes to certify private
schools as meeting the state standards for secular education. Indeed, it would be
unconstitutional for the state to do otherwise. As the Supreme Court held years
ago, the states must allow parochial schools to exist and compete with public
schools.8 5
The Supreme Court has been quite generous in allowing states to give finan-
cial assistance directly to religious institutions when schools are on the college or
graduate level. 86 The rationale has always been the factual assumption that
higher education is not as permeated with religion as the grade schools and high
schools. The Court's factual assumption may often be true, but sometimes it
does appear strained, as when the Court allows state financial assistance to relig-
iously affiliated schools with theology departments that appear to emphasize the
study of religious doctrine in a nonobjective manner.8 7
The factual assumption of less religious permeation in higher education cer-
tainly cannot apply to the case of Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind.88 There the recipient of state aid was going to attend a private
84. Id. at 657 n.5 (quoting the district court opinion in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D. N.Y. 1978)).
85. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
86. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (direct state funding in form of
annual subsidy to accredited private institutions of higher learning in Maryland upheld); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (grants to religiously affiliated universities for construction for
buildings used for secular purposes upheld).
87. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 773-74 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88. 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
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Christian College in order to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director.
Certainly Mr. Witters' education was permeated with religious symbolism. The
very purpose of his education, was to pursue" 'a career or degree in theology or
related areas.' "89
Yet the Supreme Court has also held that similar aid is forbidden even
when directly given to the student who freely chooses to attend a religiously
affiliated grade school or high school. 90 Perversely, the Court has allowed tax
deductions for the parents' money spent for such religious schooling.9 1 I say
that the decision is perverse because deductions benefit the rich more than the
poor, while tax credits (or alternatively, a tuition voucher system) do not share
that bias.
Some argue that if the state removes the economic roadblocks it sets to the
development of a diverse private and parochial school system, there will be eco-
nomic discrimination: the rich will all go to the same schools. Actually, the
present system causes much more economic isolation. The very rich can already
afford to go to private academies. They realize the importance of education, and
they have the means to pay for it.92 Those who are not in the very rich category
but still are well to do, often live in upper middle class houses in areas that are
economically well off. One reason these houses are worth a lot is because they
are in the areas with good, or very good, public schools.
With a voucher system, a middle class, lower middle class, or even low
economic class person would be able to afford to send his or her child to a
different school outside of the district. Housing may even possibly become more
integrated economically, because the value of a house will no longer in large part
be a function of the worth of the local public school district in which the house is
located. The tuition voucher system would make house location a less impor-
tant factor in choosing a good education.
Yet the Supreme Court has not moved in this direction. Indeed, the results
of some of its cases-for example, the rulings making cross district school busing
a very unusual occurrence;93 the ruling permitting great disparities in the fund-
ing of public school districts within the same state9 4 -have not fostered eco-
nomic integration. A tuition voucher system may encourage more economic
integration, not less.
To be sure, the very rich could always use a tuition voucher to help them
subsidize the tuition costs of very posh high schools, closed to the middle or
lower economic classes because the tuition (even with a tuition voucher system)
89. That is why the State of Washington denied him aid. Id. at 750 (quoting the Washington
Commission for the Blind Policy Statement).
90. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
92. Fierman, What It Takes to be Rich In America, FORTUNE, Apr. 13, 1987, at 22, 25 (families
with incomes above $75,000 per year spend four times more on education and three times more on
books than those below $75,000).
93. See Hills v. Gautreux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
94. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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would still be very high. If experience dictated that a tuition voucher system
exacerbated economic isolationism, the legislature could always deny the tuition
voucher to the most affluent. One might add that very posh schools would not
provide a better education, just a more expensive one. Spending more money on
grade and high school education helps produce better results, to a point. After
that point, the money spent has no correlation with better education as mea-
sured by any objective data, such as achievement scores. The very rich would
not therefore have better schools, only more expensive ones. And such very
expensive private schools already exist today.
What the tuition voucher system may do is provide more choices for every-
one, rich or poor. To the extent that the tuition voucher system creates a greater
diversity of private schools, to the extent the system fosters competition, it
should improve education for everyone.
Whether or not a tuition voucher system is a wise policy decision, the con-
stitutionality of that system in fact finds strong support in the case law. Yet, it
also faces strong barriers created by other case law. The same Supreme Court-
indeed, some of the same justices-have written these cases that appear to be
fundamentally inconsistent. We might also say these cases are unprincipled, be-
cause the principles that run through one set of cases is simply at odds with
whatever principles run through the other set. If we think of cases as building
blocks that can be used to reach to higher law, the Supreme Court has given us
some poor building blocks. If I may mix metaphors, the cases in this area are
more like the childhood game of chutes and ladders. Some cases are ladders
that lead to a tuition voucher system; others are the chutes. The roll of the dice
may decide whether a carefully drafted tuition voucher system lands on a square
leading to a chute, or a ladder.
CONCLUSION
Winston Churchill, when he came to this country to give his famous "Iron
Curtain" speech, visited much of our land by rail. It is said that in the dining
car one evening, he offered a toast with a glass of cognac. He remarked that in
the course of his long life, he had probably drunk enough cognac to fill the
railroad car. One of his friends disputed that. With some quick mathematical
computations he figured out that Churchill could not have drunk more than half
a railroad car of cognac. The aged Churchill's response, as he lifted the glass,
was: "So little time; so much to do."
In the short time I have had, I cannot begin to explore the apparent funda-
mental inconsistencies of too many of the modem Court's rulings. Unfortu-
nately, the justices have given a lot of fodder to commentators who focus on
such problems. The justices should focus on these problems as well.
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